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Abstract: 
Having insight into one’s abilities is essential, yet it remains unclear whether people generally 
perceive their skills accurately or inaccurately. In the present analysis, we examined the overall 
correspondence between self-evaluations of ability (e.g., academic ability, intelligence, language 
competence, medical skills, sports ability, and vocational skills) and objective performance 
measures (e.g., standardized test scores, grades, and supervisor evaluations) across 22 meta-
analyses, in addition to considering factors that moderate this relationship. Although individual 
meta-analytic effects ranged from .09 to .63, the mean correlation between ability self-
evaluations and performance outcomes across meta-analyses was moderate (M = .29, SD = .11). 
Further, the relation was stronger when self-evaluations were specific to a given domain rather 
than broad and when performance tasks were objective, familiar, or low in complexity. Taken 
together, these findings indicate that people have only moderate insight into their abilities but 
also underscore the contextual factors that enable accurate self-perception of ability. 
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Article: 
Since antiquity, scholars and laypersons alike have recognized the inherent difficulty of 
acquiring self-knowledge. Indeed, both classic and modern perspectives in the behavioral 
sciences suggest that self-perception is susceptible to a variety of biasing influences (see Alicke 
& Sedikides, 2011; Dunning, 2005; Vazire & Wilson, 2012). Perhaps Benjamin Franklin 
(1750) said it best when he claimed that “there are three Things extreamely hard: Steel, a 
Diamond, and to know one’s self” (p. 6). In this article, we focus on the accuracy of people’s 
assessment of their own ability. That is, we examine whether people’s perceptions of their ability 
to perform specific tasks match their actual ability to perform such tasks. 
In thousands of studies across several disciplines (i.e., psychology, education, medicine, 
management, sports science, and language learning), researchers have explored the 
correspondence between self-evaluations of ability and more objective criteria, such as test 
performances and supervisor evaluations. Scholars have meta-analyzed (i.e., quantitatively 
aggregated) some of these findings within specific domains to explore the overall relation 
between self-evaluations and performance among students, employees, athletes, and other 
populations (e.g., Falchikov & Boud, 1989; Mabe & West, 1982). However, in existing meta-
analyses, researchers typically focus on studies published within a single discipline or ability 
domain, lacking the breadth necessary to address the broader question of self-insight regarding 
abilities. The purpose of the present study was to synthesize current meta-analyses to reach one 
broad conclusion about the accuracy of self-evaluation. As of present, few researchers have 
linked these diverse meta-analyses despite their common theme (for exceptions, see Dunning, 
2005; Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004). Therefore, the primary aims of the present article were to 
bridge the gap among findings across different disciplines and methods, to derive an overall 
estimate of the relation between ability self-evaluation and objective performance, and to 
identify which factors affect the accuracy of self-assessments regarding abilities. 
A metasynthesis of self-evaluation research is essential for several reasons. First, by aggregating 
across thousands of individual studies and hundreds of thousands of participants, a metasynthetic 
approach can provide the most robust estimate of the accuracy of self-evaluations in the literature 
to date. Beyond the theoretical importance that understanding self-assessment accuracy carries 
for current perspectives on self and identity processes (Leary & Tangney, 2012; Marsh, Craven, 
& McInerney, 2008), our analysis should also be of considerable practical value, given that 
ability self-assessments predict important life choices (e.g., the selection of careers and academic 
majors; Bandura, 1997). Along these lines, people with inflated perceptions of competence 
pursue careers for which they are underqualified (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999), and people with 
deflated perceptions of competence fail to pursue careers in which they might succeed (Chipman, 
Krantz, & Silver, 1992; Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003). Moreover, our article should serve as an 
important bridge between self-evaluation scholars of different disciplines. By aggregating 
findings across several independent domains, our analysis may call attention to the 
interdisciplinary nature of self-knowledge research. 
Overview 
In the upcoming pages, we first discuss previous theory and research on the correspondence 
between self-evaluations of ability and objective performance criteria, as well as factors that 
moderate this relationship. Second, we critique 22 meta-analyses in which the relation between 
self-evaluations and objective standards was examined. Along these lines, we present results 
from a metasynthesis, an aggregation of existing meta-analyses (Johnson, Scott-Sheldon, & 
Carey, 2010). In our synthesis, we estimated the overall relation between ability self-evaluations 
and objective performance across domains, and we evaluated potential moderators. Third, we 
highlight the limitations of our findings and avenues for future self-evaluation research. We also 
provide recommendations for better reporting in meta-analyses to enable future syntheses of 
meta-analytic findings. 
Accuracy of Self-Perceptions 
Intuitively, one would expect that people have relatively accurate perceptions of their abilities. 
Indeed, many would presume that “no one knows you like you know yourself.” People have a 
lifetime of experience learning about their strengths and weaknesses, and they often receive clear 
and continual feedback about their performance in important domains (e.g., school and work). 
Further, prominent theories suggest that people seek to resolve uncertainty about the self by 
obtaining self-knowledge through comparisons with objective criteria, including relevant peers 
(Festinger, 1954) or past performances (Albert, 1977). Self-knowledge is extremely valuable in 
informing critical decisions that people make on daily basis, such as whom to marry and what 
jobs to pursue. Having inaccurate self-views would compromise these decisions, leading people 
to have unsatisfying careers and relationships. From an evolutionary standpoint (Buss, 2009), it 
could be argued that self-knowledge has survival value, in that early humans who overestimated 
their knowledge and abilities would have been less likely to survive in a dangerous environment. 
Despite these converging perspectives on the utility of accurate ability perceptions, researchers 
over the last several decades have often found self-perceptions to be off the mark (see Ackerman, 
Beier, & Bowen, 2002; Davis et al., 2006; Dunning et al., 2004). For example, self-assessments 
of competence among medical trainees show low to moderate relations with their actual 
competence as measured by expert evaluations and performance on objective tests (Gordon, 
1991; Haun, Zeringue, Leach, & Foley, 2000). Employees’ evaluations of their job performance 
are only weakly related to evaluations of their performance by supervisors and coworkers (Shore, 
Shore, & Thornton, 1992; Thornton, 1980). Self-evaluations of ability among music students 
show weak relations with evaluations by music teachers (Hewitt, 2005). Athletes’ perceptions of 
their sports ability conflict with the perceptions of their coaches (Felson, 1981). Finally, college 
students’ perceptions of their course performance and degree of learning often bear weak 
resemblance to their actual level of performance and learning (Hacker, Bol, Horgan, & Ernest, 
2000; Lew, Alwis, & Schmidt, 2010). 
Moreover, just as there are reasons why people should have insight into their abilities, there are 
also reasons why people should not have perfect insight into their abilities. For example, 
although people desire accurate self-beliefs, they also desire flattering self-beliefs. In some 
contexts, the desire for accuracy can be trumped by the desire for flattering conclusions about 
one’s abilities, especially among those who are dispositionally high in self-enhancement (Alicke 
& Sedikides, 2009; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). Additionally, although there are some domains in 
which useful feedback is pervasive, in other domains feedback is more difficult to obtain 
(Caputo & Dunning, 2005) or is positively biased (DePaulo & Bell, 1996). Human-relations 
experts encourage people to dole out praise lavishly, and millions of people follow such advice 
(Carnegie, 1936/2012). The downside is that people typically accept such praise as an indicator 
of their ability rather than as an attempt to win favor (Fay, Jordan, & Ehrlinger, 2011). Some 
scholars have noted that a small degree of bias in self-perceptions of ability can be beneficial 
(Taylor & Brown, 1988): People with slightly inflated, illusory self-beliefs tend to be happier 
and have more friends than those without them (Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 
2003), but the direction of causality is unclear (Colvin & Block, 1994). 
Ironically, people remain largely unaware of these biases in self-evaluation. Although people can 
accurately infer when others commit judgmental biases, they are largely “blind” to the biases 
they have themselves (Pronin, 2008; Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, 2004). Moreover, biases in self-
perception might arise because people do not have access to the nonconscious psychological 
processes that influence their emotions and behavior (Wilson, 2002; Wilson & Dunn, 2004). 
People usually rely on explicit, easily available information to evaluate their ability to perform 
specific tasks, without realizing that their performances may also be a function of nonconscious 
motives (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Troetschel, 2001; Custers & Aarts, 2010) 
or exposure to contextual cues that elude conscious awareness (Gendolla & Silvestrini, 
2010; Mussweiler, Ruter, & Epstude, 2004). Finally, absences in self-insight are most prevalent 
among people who lack competence (e.g., Ehrlinger, Johnson, Banner, Dunning, & Kruger, 
2008; Kruger & Dunning, 1999). Lacking competence in a given domain produces a “double 
burden” that undermines performance as well as people’s ability to accurately assess their 
performance (see Dunning, 2011). 
In sum, despite the practical value of accurate ability perceptions, converging perspectives 
suggest that self-perceptions may be somewhat askew. However, the degree of accuracy in self-
perceptions is still largely a matter of debate. In several meta-analyses over the last 30 years, 
researchers have attempted to estimate the accuracy of ability self-evaluations. For example, in 
an early exploration, Mabe and West (1982) found that the mean correlation between ability self-
evaluations and indices of objective performance was relatively weak (r = .29) and was highly 
variable (SD = .25) when aggregating across 55 studies and 267 effects in the psychology 
literature.1 Around the same time, Hansford and Hattie (1982) found a mean correlation of .21 
(SD = .23) after aggregating across 128 studies and 1,136 effects in the education literature. 
Thus, initial meta-analytic efforts were broadly consistent with the notion that ability self-
perception is inherently challenging and is often flawed. Given the sheer magnitude of studies 
available, in later meta-analytic efforts, researchers began to explore the accuracy of ability self-
perceptions in specific domains, such as memory ability (Beaudoin & Desrichard, 2011), 
intelligence (Freund & Kasten, 2012), and interpersonal sensitivity (Hall, Andrzejewski, & 
Yopchick, 2009). However, this leaves unresolved the fundamental question of the accuracy of 
ability self-evaluation across various domains and contexts, which relates to the critical question 
of how well people know their abilities in general. 
Moderators of Self-Insight 
Although the relation between ability self-evaluation and objective performance is broadly 
considered to be modest (rs typically ranging between .2 and .4), it is also recognized that 
several factors may affect this relationship (Davis et al., 2006; Dunning et al., 2004). Critical 
moderators of self-perception accuracy can be grouped into two categories: aspects of the 
performance task and aspects of the items used to measure self-perceptions of ability. 
Perhaps the most studied moderator of the association between self-assessment and objective 
performance is the specificity of the items used to measure perceived ability (Ackerman et al., 
2002). In specific self-report measures, participants are asked to evaluate their ability to perform 
a concrete task, which they later perform. Alternatively, in general self-report measures, 
participants are asked to evaluate their ability more broadly. Because specific measures are better 
matched to the performance domain, they tend to yield higher correlations with objective 
performance than general measures (Hertzog, Park, Morrell, & Martin, 2000; Swann, Chang-
Schneider, & McClarty, 2007). For example, self-assessment of ability to shoot free throws 
should tether more strongly to free-throw-shooting performance than self-assessment of 
basketball skill or general athleticism. Furthermore, unlike specific abilities, general abilities are 
abstract and can be defined with self-serving criteria, which further weakens their validity 
(Dunning, Myerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989; Greve & Wentura, 2003). For example, people may 
selectively define athleticism by highlighting the sports in which they excel and by downplaying 
the sports in which they rank poorly. 
Another critical moderator is the timing of the self-assessment procedure. Specifically, self-
evaluation of ability can be obtained either before or after the performance criterion. Researchers 
have presumed that assessing ability after the criterion should yield stronger effects because the 
task itself should provide feedback that informs judgments of ability and self-efficacy 
(Ackerman & Wolman, 2007; Bandura, 1997). Conversely, when people provide self-
assessments before the criterion, their judgments are likely based on memories of past 
experiences with the task, which may be biased by memory decay and the desire to remember 
one’s performances positively (Gramzow & Willard, 2006; M. Ross & Wilson, 2003). In 
addition, self-assessments in advance of performance may be unduly influenced by one’s 
intentions or planned effort regarding performance, rather than past performance outcomes 
themselves (Oettingen & Mayer, 2002). However, it is also possible that providing self-
evaluations before tasks strengthens the relation between self-evaluations and performance 
outcomes. Desires for self-consistency may lead people who evaluate themselves favorably to 
devote more effort to the task than people who evaluate themselves unfavorably (Festinger, 
1957). 
Other moderators of the relation between self-evaluation and performance outcomes may include 
aspects of the performance task, such as its familiarity and complexity. Specifically, the relation 
between self-evaluation and objective performance should be stronger for familiar than 
unfamiliar tasks, given that familiar tasks provide more opportunities to receive diagnostic 
feedback. When people have little experience with the performance domain, they have no basis 
to form self-judgments, which should weaken their validity (Bandura, 1977). Additionally, 
people may lack competence in unfamiliar domains, which should further undermine accuracy of 
self-evaluations (Ehrlinger et al., 2008). Consistent with this perspective, self-assessment 
accuracy for a given individual increases as familiarity with a task increases over time (Hertzog, 
Saylor, Fleece, & Dixon, 1994; Rebok & Balcerak, 1989). 
Moreover, the relation between self-evaluation and objective performance should be stronger for 
low-complexity tasks (e.g., running) as opposed to high-complexity tasks (e.g., playing tennis). 
High-complexity tasks often require greater knowledge, ability, effort, and persistence to 
complete than do low-complexity tasks (Bandura, 1986). In addition, complex tasks often require 
several abilities rather than a single ability to carry out effectively and, therefore, require a 
broader range of skills (Bandura, 1997). Adequately adjusting for each of these factors during 
self-evaluation is a challenging exercise that might undermine self-evaluation accuracy. 
Finally, the relation between self-evaluation and objective performance outcomes may depend on 
whether the performance task is evaluated with an objective or subjective scoring process. Some 
performance tasks yield relatively objective outcomes, such as the number of items answered or 
recalled correctly. Other performance outcomes are more subjective in nature and require the 
interpretation of performance by another person (e.g., evaluations by supervisors, teachers, or 
coaches). Subjective evaluations may thus entail a greater degree of error than objective 
evaluations, as external raters may be unintentionally biased by social comparisons and 
stereotypes (Biernat, 2003;Dunning & Hayes, 1996). Therefore, the accuracy of self-perceptions 
should be higher when performance outcomes are objective rather than subjective. 
Metasynthesis Method 
To estimate the relation between self-evaluations of ability and objective performance criteria 
across domains, we first identified all relevant meta-analyses in which this relationship was 
examined. Then, we estimated the overall mean relationship between ability self-evaluations and 
objective performance across meta-analyses. Finally, we tested whether critical factors—such as 
self-evaluation specificity and timing, as well as task familiarity, complexity, and objectivity—
moderated the relation between self-perceptions of ability and performance outcomes across 
meta-analyses. Going beyond prior work in which the relation between self-evaluations and 
objective performance was examined in specific contexts (Beaudoin & Desrichard, 2011; Freund 
& Kasten, 2012), in the current analysis, we examined self-knowledge of ability across settings, 
answering the broader question of how well people evaluate their abilities. 
Literature search 
Meta-analyses were obtained through searches of computerized databases. To qualify for 
inclusion, meta-analyses had to include (a) studies sampling participants with a mean age more 
than 13 years; (b) a measure of self-perceived ability to perform specific tasks including direct 
evaluations of performance, ability, skill, or knowledge as well as domain-specific self-concept, 
self-efficacy, self-esteem, or self-confidence; (c) an external criterion for ability including 
standardized test performances, grades, teacher evaluations, or supervisor evaluations; and (d) 
the overall mean effect size indexing the relation between ability self-evaluation and external 
criteria (r). This search yielded a total of 22 meta-analyses in which self-evaluations were 
compared with objective performance outcomes (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Meta-Analyses in Which Ability Self-Evaluations Were Compared With Objective 
Performance, Listed by Domain 
Citation  Domain  n  k  r 
Falchikov and Boud (1989) Academic ability  3,958  45  .39 
Hansford and Hattie (1982) Academic ability  20,283  1,136  .21 
Huang (2011) Academic ability  12,406  32  .24 
Moller, Pohlmann, Koller, and Marsh (2009) Academic ability  125,308  69  .39 
Multon, Brown, and Lent (1991)  Academic ability  4,998  38  .38 
Richardson, Abraham, and Bond (2012) Academic ability  46,570  67  .31 
Robbins et al. (2004)  Academic ability  9,958  18  .38 
Freund and Kasten (2012)  Intellectual ability  22,546  154  .33 
Ross (1998)  Language 
competence  
2,492  60  .63 
Blanch-Hartigan (2011)  Medical skills  4,057  30  .22 
Beaudoin and Desrichard (2011)  Memory ability  24,897  169  .15 
Hall, Andrzejewski, and Yopchick (2009)  Nonverbal skills  1,717  20  .09 
Sitzmann, Ely, Brown, and Bauer (2010)  Perceived 
knowledge  
16,951  137  .27 
Moritz, Feltz, Fahrbach, and Mack (2000)  Sports ability  3,055  102  .38 
Woodman and Hardy (2003)  Sports ability  2,808  42  .24 
Mabe and West (1982)  Various  14,811  267  .29 
Bowling, Eschleman, Wang, Kirkendall, and 
Alarcon (2010) 
Vocational skills  2,020  12  .23 
Conway and Huffcutt (1997)  Vocational skills  10,359  50  .22 
Harris and Schaubroeck (1988)  Vocational skills  3,957  36  .22 
Judge and Bono (2001)  Vocational skills  1,122  10  .19 
Sadri and Robertson (1993)  Vocational skills  1,658  16  .36 
Stajkovic and Luthans (1998)  Vocational skills  21,616  157  .34 
Note: n and k represent the number of participants and studies from each analysis; r represents 
the mean correlation between self-evaluations and  
objective performance across studies. 
Forty-nine related meta-analyses were located but were excluded because they failed to meet one 
or more of the inclusion criteria. For example, several meta-analyses were excluded because the 
researchers examined the correspondence between self-ratings of personality (e.g., extraversion, 
neuroticism) and either informant ratings of personality (Connolly, Kavanagh, & Viswesvaran, 
2007; Kenny & West, 2010) or behavioral outcomes that are theoretically related to personality 
(Bogg & Roberts, 2004; Fleeson & Galagher, 2009). Although important in their own right, these 
articles are oriented toward testing the accuracy of self-perceptions of personality and not self-
perceptions of ability (for reviews, see Vazire & Carlson, 2010, 2011). In other meta-analyses, 
researchers compared self-reported attitudes with behavioral criteria (Glasman & Albarracín, 
2006; Kraus, 1995) or implicit attitudes (Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 
2005; Krizan & Suls, 2008). Although these articles demonstrate the potential insight people 
have into their own attitudes, they do not have direct relevance to the accuracy of ability self-
evaluation. Finally, meta-analyses were excluded if the researchers reported the relation between 
ability self-evaluation and objective performance only after controlling for other factors, such as 
prior performance (e.g., Valentine, DuBois, & Cooper, 2004). 
Coding of moderators 
Meta-analyses were coded to examine several potential moderating factors. The coding was done 
by two undergraduate research assistants who were unaware of the specific purpose of the 
metasynthesis. Disagreements between coders were resolved by the first author. Meta-analyses 
were coded with respect to the following factors: domain of study (κ = .94), self-evaluation term 
(κ = .94), academic discipline (κ = .88), and subjectivity of the performance outcome (κ = .84). 
Details of the coding categories are provided in the Results section. 
When multiple meta-analyses (m) provided data indicating the size of the effect (r) across 
specific coding categories (e.g., global vs. specific self-evaluation measure), we calculated an 
unweighted average correlation between ability self-evaluation and objective performance across 
meta-analyses for each condition. This yielded moderation tests for the following factors: self-
evaluation specificity (m = 7), self-evaluation timing (m = 4), task complexity (m = 2), and task 
familiarity (m = 2). We relied on the authors’ original coding in these instances, rather than 
recoding all of the original articles. 
Finally, we coded whether the individual meta-analytic effects were derived from a fixed-effect 
(e.g., Hedges & Olkin, 1985), random-effect (e.g., Hunter & Schmidt, 2004), or an unweighted 
model. This allowed us to explore whether self-evaluation accuracy estimates were affected by 
the statistical approach used in prior meta-analyses. In one meta-analysis, both fixed- and 
random-effect models were used, and, therefore, the meta-analysis could not be clustered into 
any of provided categories (Hall et al., 2009). 
Study treatment and analyses 
In most meta-analyses, the researchers provided a single effect size; however, if more than one 
was provided (Moller, Pohlmann, Koller, & Marsh, 2009), we averaged these effects (see Table 
1). When possible, we used the uncorrected, unweighted mean correlation between ability self-
evaluation and external criteria as an estimate of effect size (r). However, in some meta-analyses, 
the researchers reported only weighted (Beaudoin & Desrichard, 2011) or corrected (Harris & 
Schaubroeck, 1988; Richardson, Abraham, & Bond, 2012; Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998) values. 
To estimate the overall effect size across domains, we calculated an unweighted mean of the 22 
meta-analytic effects. Positive relations indicate stronger correspondence between self-
evaluations and objective performance and, therefore, greater accuracy of self-evaluation. 
Results and Discussion 
Before reporting our results, it is important to note that there were several limitations to the use 
of metasynthesis in this context. Some of the limitations are due to the particular content of these 
meta-analyses; others are due to general methodological problems that could occur with any 
meta-analysis. We discuss these limitations in the final section of this article (see 
the Appendix for more specific details). 
In this section, we first describe the correspondence between self-evaluations and objective 
performance outcomes across meta-analyses. Then, we examine whether self-evaluation 
measurement factors moderated this relationship. Finally, we examine whether aspects of the 
domain and performance task moderated self-insight of ability. 
Overall effect 
When considering the entire collection of 22 meta-analyses, the overall correlation between 
ability self-evaluation and objective performance was .29, typically regarded as a moderate effect 
(Cohen, 1992). There was some dispersion in the individual effects (SD = .11). However, in all 
of the meta-analyses, the researchers reported an effect that was positive in direction; in addition, 
in 21 out of 22 meta-analyses, the researchers reported an effect ranging between .09 and .39 
(see Table 2). There was one potential outlier, with an effect size of .63 (S. Ross, 1998); 
removing this effect, however, did not alter the observed pattern of results (M = .28, SD = .09). 
In sum, there appears to be a consistent, moderate relationship between self-perceptions of 
ability and measures of performance across a variety of domains and operationalizations of these 
constructs. 
Table 2. Stem and Leaf Display of Meta-Analytic Effects 
Stem  Leaf 
.6  3         
.5          
.4          
.3  1  3  4  6  8  8  8  9  9 
.2  1  2  2  2  3  4  4  7  9 
.1  5  9        
.0  9         
 
Self-evaluation measurement moderators 
Self-evaluation term 
Effect sizes were mostly moderate in size regardless of the particular operationalization of ability 
self-evaluation (e.g., self-concept, self-efficacy; see Table 3). For example, seven meta-analyses 
in which performance/skill evaluations were examined yielded an effect size of .29, and seven 
meta-analyses in which self-efficacy was examined yielded an effect size of .30. 
Table 3. Self-Evaluation Measurement Moderators 
Moderator  m  r  Range 
Self-evaluation term 
Self-concept  1  .39  
Self-efficacy 7  .30  .15–.38  
Performance/skill evaluation  7  .29  .09–.63 
Perceived knowledge  1  .27  
Self-confidence  1  .24  
Domain self-esteem  1  .23  
Self-evaluation specificity 
Specific self-evaluation  7  .28  .13–.42 
Global self-evaluation  7  .18  .09–.26 
Self-evaluation timing 
After criterion  4  .29  .15–.40 
Before criterion  4 .27 .05–.49 
Note: m represents the number of meta-analyses that contributed to each effect; r represents the 
mean correlation between self-evaluations  and objective performance across studies. 
Self-evaluation specificity 
The relation between ability self-evaluation and objective performance was descriptively larger 
when self-evaluations were measured with specific (.28) as opposed to global (.18) indices of 
perceived ability. This finding bolsters prior claims that specific self-perceptions are more 
accurate because they are better matched to the performance domain (Ackerman et al., 
2002; Hertzog et al., 2000). Additionally, this finding is consistent with prior research showing 
that the attitude–behavior relation is stronger when specific rather than general attitudes are 
assessed (Swann et al., 2007). However, although specific self-perceptions tethered more 
strongly to performance outcomes than general self-perceptions, the relation was only moderate 
in both circumstances (rs < .30). 
Self-evaluation timing 
Scholars have argued that self-evaluations of ability should be more accurate when they are 
measured after tests, given that the experience of taking tests may provide useful feedback for 
self-evaluation (Ackerman & Wolman, 2007; Bandura, 1997). On the contrary, results from four 
meta-analyses (Beaudoin & Desrichard, 2011; Blanch-Hartigan, 2011; Falchikov & Boud, 
1989; Moritz, Feltz, Fahrbach, & Mack, 2000) showed little difference in effect size depending 
on whether self-assessments were made before (.27) or after (.29) the criterion. 
It is somewhat surprising that the completion of performance tasks does not benefit self-
assessment accuracy. Logically, one would expect that taking a test should provide some useful 
information on how skilled one is at this test. However, recent findings suggest that biased self-
perceptions may fuel how people experience performance tasks (Critcher & Dunning, 
2009; Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003). That is, people with negative self-perceptions experience 
tasks to be more difficult than people with positive self-perceptions, despite equivalent 
performance outcomes. Therefore, biased perceptions of performance may negate any benefits 
derived from evaluating the self after rather than before performance tasks. 
Domain and task moderators 
Performance domain 
There was some variation in self-evaluation accuracy by domain (see Table 4). Seven meta-
analyses in which self-perceptions of academic ability were examined yielded an overall effect 
size of .33. Similarly, six meta-analyses in which self-perceptions of vocational skill were 
examined yielded an effect size of .26, and two meta-analyses in which self-perceptions of sports 
ability were examined yielded an effect size of .31. The largest effect was observed in the 
domain of language competence (.63), and the weakest effect was observed for nonverbal skills 
(.09). 
Table 4. Domain and Task Moderators 
Moderator  m  r  Range 
Performance domain 
Language competence  1  .63  
Academic ability  7  .33  .21–.39 
Intellectual ability  1  .33  
Sports ability  2  .31  .24–.38 
Vocational skills  6  .26  .19–.36 
Medical skills  1  .22  
Memory ability  1  .15  
Nonverbal skills  1  .09  
Academic discipline 
Language  1  .63  
Education  3  .33  .21–.39 
Sports science  2  .31  .24–.38 
Psychology  14  .27  .09–.38 
Management  1  .27  
Medicine  1  .22  
Task objectivity 
Objective test  4  .30  .09–.63 
Subjective test  4  .22  .19–.23 
Task familiarity 
High familiarity  2  .32  .25–.39 
Low familiarity  2  .26  .18–.34 
Task complexity 
Low complexity  2  .32  .10–.53 
Medium complexity  2  .21  .14–.28 
High complexity  2  .20  .15–.24 
Note: m represents the number of meta-analyses that contributed to each effect; r represents the 
mean correlation between self-evaluations and objective performance across studies. 
 
It is likely that features of these domains contributed to variations in self-perception accuracy. 
Language competence is a domain in which feedback is ubiquitous, and skill is objectively 
defined. The highly concrete and verifiable nature of skills within this domain provides little 
latitude for self-enhancement biases that thrive when domains are more ambiguous (Dunning et 
al., 1989). Alternatively, nonverbal skill is a domain in which people receive little to no direct 
feedback. Although people often make judgments about whether others are telling the truth or 
lying from nonverbal cues (e.g., eye gaze), they rarely receive objective feedback indicating 
whether others are actually telling the truth or lying as they would in a typical experiment (Bond 
& DePaulo, 2008). This lack of feedback may lead people to remain ignorant of their true 
nonverbal skill for most of their lives. Consistent with this argument, research suggests that clear 
and continual feedback about one’s performances and judgments over time is an essential 
antidote to self-knowledge deficits (Butler & Winne, 1995). 
Academic discipline 
With the exception of language learning (.63), effect sizes were largely constant across academic 
disciplines. Fourteen meta-analyses were published in psychology journals, and these studies 
yielded a combined effect size of .27. Three meta-analyses published in education (.33) and two 
meta-analyses published in sports science (.31) yielded comparable findings. 
Task objectivity 
In four meta-analyses, researchers used only objective performance measures, whereas in four 
other meta-analyses, researchers used only subjective performance measures. Self-perception 
accuracy appeared to be greater for tasks that were evaluated with an objective process (.30) as 
opposed to a subjective process (.22). Evaluating task performance with an objective process 
(e.g., the number of items answered correctly) may eliminate judgment biases that create error in 
the measurement of performance during subjective tasks (Biernat, 2003; Dunning & Hayes, 
1996). Therefore, differences in self-insight as a function of task objectivity may occur because 
subjective tests contain greater measurement error than objective tests. 
Moreover, differences in self-insight as a function of task objectivity may help explain 
differences in self-insight across domains (e.g., language competence, academic ability). 
Performance in some domains may be assessed with highly objective performance criteria. For 
example, language competence is typically measured with objective tests, such as whether 
people can identify the meaning of a word or can speak a word with the correct pronunciation. 
Conversely, other domains incorporate tasks that have more subjective outcome indices, such as 
performance evaluations by supervisors or coaches. Therefore, it is possible that differences in 
self-perception accuracy by performance domain are at least partly explained by the objectivity 
of tasks within each domain. 
Task familiarity 
Aggregating across two meta-analyses (Beaudoin & Desrichard, 2011; Moritz et al., 2000), the 
correspondence between ability self-evaluations and objective performance was slightly larger 
among studies in which familiar tasks (.32) rather than unfamiliar tasks (.26) were used. These 
findings suggest that self-perception accuracy may improve as experience with tasks grows over 
time. 
Task complexity 
Data from two meta-analyses (Beaudoin & Desrichard, 2011; Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998) 
demonstrated that self-insight of ability was greater for low-complexity (.32) than medium-
complexity (.21) or high-complexity (.20) tasks. These findings indicate that simple, 
straightforward tasks may facilitate accurate self-evaluations more than complex, multiskill 
tasks. Just as complex personal attitudes are open to a variety of self-serving construals, feedback 
from tasks that involve complex skills (e.g., academic ability) may also be more open to self-
serving interpretations than feedback from simple tasks (e.g., note taking; Dunning et al., 1989). 
However, it is also possible that performance on complex tasks is measured with greater error, 
given that complex tasks involve a weighting of multiple performance criteria, which may 
weaken their relationship with self-evaluations. 
Meta-analytic method moderators 
Self-perception accuracy fluctuated somewhat as a function of the meta-analytic model used 
(see Table 5). Specifically, in 14 meta-analyses, researchers used a random-effect model and 
obtained an average effect of .28. In two meta-analyses, researchers used an unweighted model 
and obtained an average effect of .30. In five meta-analyses, researchers used a fixed-effect 
model and obtained an average effect of .37. These findings suggest that fluctuations in self-
insight across meta-analyses can be partly attributed to differences in the statistical model used to 
aggregate individual effects. 
Table 5. Meta-Analytic Method Moderators 
Moderator  m  r  Range 
Model type 
Fixed-effect  5  .37  .22–.63 
Unweighted  2  .30  .21–.39 
Random-effect  14  .28  .15–.39 
Measurement error 
Corrected  10  .35  .23–.50 
Uncorrected  10  .27  .19–.40 
Note: m represents the number of meta-analyses that contributed to each effect; r represents the 
mean correlation between self-evaluations and objective performance across studies. 
Additionally, the relation between self-perceptions and objective performance varied as a 
function of whether effect sizes were corrected for measurement error. Across 10 meta-analyses 
in which both corrected and uncorrected values were provided, the average effect was 
descriptively larger when examining corrected values (.35) than uncorrected values (.27). 
Because our primary model relied on uncorrected values, we may have slightly underestimated 
the magnitude of self-insight of ability. Nonetheless, self-insight was only moderate even after 
accounting for measurement error. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
In the present synthesis of 22 meta-analyses, the relation between ability self-evaluations and 
objective performance outcomes across several domains was found to be moderate. Additionally, 
self-insight of ability fluctuated as a function of self-evaluation measurement and task 
moderators. However, there were limitations to the current approach that necessitate future 
study. In the next two sections, we discuss methodological and theoretical issues that are 
deserving of future research attention. We elaborate on some of these specific issues in 
the Appendix. 
Methodological issues 
First, we used a descriptive approach that focused on a comparison of effect sizes across 
different conditions. This approach did not influence conclusions regarding the overall effect, in 
which we simply observed the size of the relation between self-evaluations and objective 
performance measures across domains. However, our descriptive approach did make it 
challenging to interpret results from some of the moderation tests in which differences between 
conditions were relatively small (e.g., task familiarity). Future research is needed to formally test 
the impact of currently considered moderators on self-insight of ability and whether self-insight 
is significantly greater in some conditions than others. 
Second, we used an unweighted average of the individual meta-analytic effects to estimate the 
population effect. Although previous research suggests that unweighted averages outperform 
averages that weight by sample size in traditional meta-analyses of individual studies (Bonett, 
2008; Krizan, 2010; Shuster, 2010), future work is needed to examine whether unweighted 
averages are superior to weighted averages in metasynthesis. 
Third, we found that self-insight of ability was somewhat higher when examining effects that 
were corrected for measurement error. However, we were only able to examine the effect of 
measurement error among a subset of the meta-analyses because in several meta-analyses, 
corrected effects were not reported. Future study is needed to further explore the degree to which 
measurement error affects estimates of self-insight. Additionally, in future studies, researchers 
should explore the degree to which measurement error accounts for differences in self-insight as 
a function of critical moderators, including domain, task objectivity, and task complexity. 
Fourth, because in most meta-analyses researchers did not specify whether they incorporated 
studies in which absolute, comparative, or both types of rating scales were used, we were unable 
to examine whether self-insight of ability fluctuated as a function of measurement scale. Some 
research suggests that self-insight is greater when assessed with comparative rather than absolute 
rating scales (Goffin & Olson, 2011). If authors of prior meta-analyses incorporated data from 
absolute rating scales, it is possible that they underestimated self-insight of ability. Future 
research is needed to examine this possibility more directly, and it is advised that in future meta-
analyses, researchers report the types of scales they used with greater precision. 
Fifth, a key issue in the use of metasynthesis is the overlapping of samples across meta-analyses. 
Because of missing or incomplete information, we were unable to quantify the degree of sample 
overlap in the current article. Future researchers may consider more precise reporting of the 
samples used in each of their meta-analytic effects. 
Theoretical issues 
Although the present metasynthesis showed that self-insight of ability is moderated by several 
factors, future research is needed to uncover additional moderators. One potential moderator is 
the importance of the self-evaluation domain. Past research suggests that self-evaluation 
accuracy is higher for unimportant than important domains (John & Robins, 1993; Vazire, 2010). 
Assessment of self in important domains (e.g., physical attractiveness and intelligence) is 
clouded by motivational factors, such as a desire to perceive oneself positively, which 
undermines self-evaluation accuracy. Most of the domains studied in the present article would 
typically be regarded as important (e.g., academic and vocational skills), and thus it is possible 
that self-evaluation accuracy is higher in other domains. Nonetheless, domain importance is 
highly subjective and specific to the population being studied (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001), making 
it inappropriate to assign post hoc ratings of domain importance needed for moderation tests. 
Future research is also needed to identify why people sometimes have inaccurate perceptions of 
their abilities and to develop interventions aimed at increasing self-evaluation accuracy. 
Bolstering feelings of self-worth via self-affirmation manipulations (e.g., writing about important 
values or a personal triumph) may be one pathway toward more balanced and ultimately more 
accurate self-perceptions. For example, the common tendency for people to be overly optimistic 
about the future subsides after self-affirmation (Klein et al., 2010). Another avenue may involve 
raising interpersonal accountability, which can lead people to assess themselves with more 
scrutiny (Tetlock & Kim, 1987). 
Finally, in future studies, researchers who seek to determine the overall relation between self-
evaluations and external criteria may benefit from cross-disciplinary collaborations. For 
example, researchers could explore when and why self-insight varies across different domains 
and tasks. Additionally, in future studies, researchers could examine whether some individuals 
consistently have better self-knowledge across domains than others, and whether personality 
factors (e.g., intelligence, self-consciousness, or narcissism) contribute to global differences in 
self-knowledge. It is our hope that the present article increases awareness of the interdisciplinary 
nature of self-knowledge research and ultimately spurs productive collaborations among scholars 
of different research traditions. Now that researchers are beginning to resolve the basic question 
of how well people evaluate their abilities, future study is needed to explore the benefits and 
costs of accurate self-evaluations, and whether accurate self-evaluations are more important in 
some contexts than others. 
In our critique of the literature, we found that in prior meta-analyses, researchers sometimes 
failed to adequately report critical information, such as the samples that contributed to each 
meta-analytic effect, the type of self-evaluation measures used, and the potential role of 
measurement error in the performance criterion (see the Appendix for more details). In raising 
awareness of these omissions, it is our hope that in future meta-analyses, researchers are more 
careful in their reporting to better enable subsequent metasyntheses. Going beyond the specific 
focus of this research, the metasynthesis approach advocated here could be used to address a 
variety of different research questions in psychological science. Meta-analytic techniques are 
becoming more common, and as this trend continues, there will inevitably be research questions 
that have been examined by multiple, related meta-analyses. Researchers in these situations may 
consider adopting a metasynthetic approach to derive a robust estimate of population effects. To 
our knowledge, we are among the first in psychological science to use metasynthesis, and the 
present article could serve as a template for later researchers using this analytic technique. 
Appendix 
Measurement and reporting concerns 
There were several limitations to the use of metasynthesis for evaluating self-insight of ability 
across domains. These limitations are due to aspects of the methodology used in prior meta-
analyses, missing information, and conceptual ambiguities associated with aggregating results of 
studies in which different operationalizations of key constructs were used. In the following 
sections, we give details on each of these concerns. 
Accuracy versus bias 
In each of the meta-analyses, researchers indexed self-insight by reporting the correlation (r) 
between self-evaluations and an external criterion. Correlations are useful in providing 
information about the accuracy of self-evaluations of ability, that is, whether people who 
evaluate themselves favorably actually perform well, and whether people who evaluate 
themselves unfavorably actually perform poorly. However, correlations cannot be used to 
specify the direction or magnitude of bias in ability self-evaluations. Thus, it remains unclear 
whether deviations in self-evaluations versus objective performance are best captured by an 
overrating of ability, underrating of ability, or a combination of both processes under different 
circumstances. Both overrating and underrating have been observed in several contexts (Kruger, 
1999;Moore & Healy, 2008). However, existing self-evaluation research suggests that overrating 
may be more prevalent than underrating (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009;Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). 
Absolute versus comparative judgments 
Absolute self-evaluations are made without an explicit reference point (e.g., “How good are you 
at math?”). Conversely, comparative self-evaluations are made in relation to other people (e.g., 
“How good are you at math in comparison to the average student at your school?”). With one 
exception (Freund & Kasten, 2012), none of the meta-analyses examined in the present study 
tested the effect of this moderator, and most authors did not specify whether they used absolute, 
comparative, or both types of measures. Some research suggests that comparative self-
evaluations are more accurate than absolute self-evaluations (see Goffin & Olson, 2011). For 
example, comparative self-ratings of intelligence predict intelligence test performance better than 
absolute self-ratings (Freund & Kasten, 2012). However, people often neglect comparative 
reference points, leading them to interpret comparative self-evaluation items in an absolute 
manner (Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; Kruger, 1999). Additionally, absolute self-evaluations 
often reflect implicit social comparisons (Dunning, 2000). Thus, there are presently mixed 
findings with regard to whether absolute self-evaluations yield greater accuracy than 
comparative self-evaluations. Because most of the meta-analyses studied in the current article 
did not report the types of self-evaluation measures they used, in our analysis, we were unable to 
test whether absolute self-evaluations predict performance outcomes better than comparative 
self-evaluations. 
Definition of constructs 
To facilitate inclusion of as much data as possible, we incorporated meta-analyses in which 
several different measures of ability self-perception were used, including self-evaluations of 
ability and knowledge as well as domain-specific measures of self-concept, self-efficacy, self-
confidence, and self-esteem. Self-evaluations of ability involve an explicit assessment of one’s 
skill in a given domain (e.g., “How would you rate your math ability?”) and, thus, are the most 
direct measure of ability self-perceptions. In domain-specific self-concept measures, people are 
asked to rate how good or bad they are in a given domain (Moller, Pohlmann, Koller, & Marsh, 
2009; e.g., “How good are you at math?”). In domain-specific self-efficacy measures, people are 
asked to assess their ability to reach a performance goal or exert control over an important life 
event (Bandura, 1997; e.g., “Will you perform well on this math test?”). In domain-specific self-
confidence measures, people are asked to assess how confident they are that they can accomplish 
a given task (Woodman & Hardy, 2003; e.g., “How confident are you that you will perform well 
on the math test?”). In domain-specific self-esteem measures, people are asked to indicate how 
satisfied they are with themselves in a given domain (Bowling, Eschleman, Wang, Kirkendall, & 
Alarcon, 2010; e.g., “How satisfied are you with your math ability?”). Finally, self-evaluations 
of knowledge involve an explicit assessment of one’s knowledge in a given domain (Sitzmann, 
Ely, Brown, & Bauer, 2010; e.g., “How knowledgeable are you about math?”). Regardless of the 
particular definition of self-evaluation, in all meta-analyses, self-perceptions regarding a 
construct based on ability (e.g., math or verbal ability) were compared with an objective criterion 
assessing that ability (e.g., standardized math or verbal tests). 
Although it was beyond the scope of the current article to compare and contrast these different 
operational definitions of self-perception (see Leary & Tangney, 2012; Marsh, Craven, & 
McInerney, 2008), it is important to note that each judgment involves an evaluation of one’s 
knowledge, skill, or ability in a specific domain. Furthermore, each judgment can be 
differentiated from broader measures of personality—such as those of the Big Five personality 
traits (John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008) or global self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965)—that involve 
evaluations of one’s global emotional and behavioral tendencies as opposed to one’s ability to 
perform tasks within a specific domain. Although domain-specific self-judgments of ability that 
involve valenced aspects of the self may reflect personality traits (e.g., neuroticism; Judge, Erez, 
Bono, & Thoresen, 2002), they still focus on perceived ability or competence in a given domain 
rather than broad personality tendencies or global self-evaluations (see Freund & Kasten, 2012, 
for similar reasoning). 
Measurement error 
Although the goal of this project was to estimate the relation between self-perceptions of ability 
and objective performance outcomes, measures of self-evaluation and objective performance 
likely contain some degree of measurement error. Along these lines, objective tests of people’s 
abilities may not be perfect estimates of people’s actual abilities, especially when these tests 
involve a complex or subjective scoring process. Therefore, our results should be interpreted as 
showing the relation between measures of self-perceived ability and measures of actual ability, 
rather than showing the relation between these actual constructs. 
As we reported earlier, in several of the meta-analyses, researchers corrected for error in the 
measurement of objective performance in their effect size estimates. This allowed us to test the 
effect of such statistical corrections on the relation between ability self-evaluations and 
performance outcomes. Further, whereas in some of the meta-analyses researchers provided both 
corrected and uncorrected values (10), others provided only uncorrected (11) or corrected (1) 
values. We did not disattenuate the single corrected meta-analytic effect (Stajkovic & Luthans, 
1998), as the specific procedure that was used to correct for attenuation in this article was not 
specified. Alternatively, we simply incorporated the corrected effect into our model. As a result, 
our final model included a combination of corrected (1) and uncorrected (21) effects. 
Finally, some of the theoretical moderators we have discussed may be related to measurement 
error; performance tasks that are measured with less error should yield greater agreement with 
self-perceptions than tasks that are measured with more error. For example, tasks in which a 
subjective scoring process is used (e.g., teacher or supervisor evaluations) may yield lower 
agreement with self-perceptions because they contain greater measurement error than tasks in 
which an objective scoring process is used (e.g., the number of items answered correctly). It is 
important to note the potential role of measurement error in the interpretation of our results. 
Type of statistical model 
Another limitation of metasynthesis in this context is that in some of the meta-analyses, 
researchers used different statistical models when aggregating individual effects (e.g., fixed-
effect or random-effect models). For this reason, the standard errors of the individual meta-
analytic effects are not comparable and thus cannot be aggregated to yield meaningful 
confidence intervals or enable conclusions of statistical significance (see Hedges & Vevea, 
1998). In light of these concerns, we focus only on aggregate estimates and their ranges, without 
formal computation of relevant confidence intervals or standard errors. However, given the 
extremely large pool of respondents and studies, all of the observed effects should be precise, 
and their differences should be meaningful. 
Furthermore, the model we employed used an unweighted average of the individual meta-
analytic effects as an estimation of the population effect. Researchers have yet to discern whether 
unweighted averages outperform averages weighted by sample size in metasynthesis. In more 
traditional meta-analyses of individual studies, however, unweighted meta-analytic averages are 
robust and tend to outperform averages that weight by study sample size (see Bonett, 
2008; Krizan, 2010; Shuster, 2010; see alsoSweeny & Krizan, 2013). 
Finally, some meta-analytic procedures transform effects into Fischer’s z scores prior to 
aggregation, and then z scores are converted back into standard effect size metrics for the 
purpose of interpretation (see Johnson & Eagly, 2000; Rosenthal, 1991). We did not transform 
the individual meta-analytic effects into z scores because transformation is used to facilitate 
formal tests of statistical significance that were inappropriate in this instance. 
Overlapping samples 
A potential limitation of metasynthesis is the overlapping of samples across meta-analyses 
(Johnson, Scott-Sheldon, & Carey, 2010). We inspected the meta-analyses for shared samples. In 
two meta-analyses, the researchers did not provide information on samples used (Hansford & 
Hattie, 1982; S. Ross, 1998), and 10 meta-analyses did not have any overlapping of samples. 
There was some overlap among the remaining 10 meta-analyses; however, each of the individual 
meta-analytic effects contained unique data that were not shared by other meta-analyses. Further, 
it was not possible to quantify the degree of sample overlap because of missing information. In 
most of the meta-analyses, researchers tested multiple effects without specifying which samples 
contributed to which effects. Nonetheless, because the metasynthesis approach used here was 
descriptive in nature, it did not assume independence of observations that would be required in 
formal meta-analytic computations. 
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Notes 
1. All reported correlations represent the mean correspondence between self-evaluations and 
objective performance outcomes aggregating across numerous primary studies.  
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